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Abstract
Experimental markets working under double auction have been designed so far to
understand the equilibrium and the eﬃciency of competitive markets (in particular,
ﬁnancial markets) and to prove that automata can do as well as humans when they
trade under simple rules. In this paper, we use an experimental market to understand
the behavior of agents when they are not provided information about asks and bids.
This setting is equivalent to a search market in which every agent is looking for the
best trading counterpart. We argue that we can apply our results to ﬁnancial market,
when agents are not market makers, but they are trading through brokers, so that
they post oﬀers based on closing prices only; and to commodity markets, for which
a publicly available book does not exist. We ﬁnd evidence that this reduction in
information is sharply reducing market eﬃciency, because of available units left out
of the market. However, we ﬁnd that the double auction search market is converging
to a long term equilibrium price.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyses the eﬀect of reducing available information to traders in a double
auction market (DA henceforth). While in the standard setting the entire history of
asks and bids is made public, we do not provide such information to our traders. Asks
and bids are private and every trader can make one oﬀer at a time and to a single
counterpart. If the oﬀer is accepted, the transaction is closed and the closing price
is made public. If instead the oﬀer is withdrawn, the oﬀer and the fact that it was
withdrawn remains private information of the two counterparts. This is equivalent
to a search market, in which each player is looking for the best counterpart. We ﬁnd
evidence that this reduction of information has no substantial impact on convergence.
However, we ﬁnd the market price and quantity are often smaller than their equilib-
rium values. This has a considerable impact on the eﬃciency of the search market
with respect to the full information one. In order to make our point, we perform two
diﬀerent treatments: a control treatment exactly equivalent to the standard market
experiment with public information about asks and bids; and a uninformed treatment
(our search market), where we do not provide players with this information about asks
and bids.
The control treatment (Smith, 1962) consists of simulating transactions in a mar-
ket where players are randomly assigned the role of either buyers or sellers. A single
homogeneous good can be bought or sold during a given number of periods, each one
of ﬁnite length. Each buyer is assigned a valuation for the single unit of the good
he is endowed with. Similarly, each seller is assigned a cost for his unit of the good.
Sorting individual valuations and costs from the highest to the lowest and from the
lowest to the highest respectively gives a demand and a supply curves. Valuations
and costs are assigned so that the set of possible transaction is non empty. The com-
petitive equilibrium price and quantity are determined by the intersection of these
two curves. Market rules dictate that buyers cannot bid over their own valuation
and sellers cannot ask under their own cost. One of the key features of this design
is indeed that every player is always informed about the best ask and the best bid
2at any moment in time (so called close order book). To replace the best ask (bid),
a seller (buyer) has to submit another oﬀer which is lower (higher) than the current
one. This is known as the bid/ask improvement rule. When a buyer and a seller
come to an agreement, the closing price is recorded, the book is cleared and new asks
and bids can be submitted, so that every agent is given centralized information as in
a stock market.
In this experimental market, agents are indeed asked to behave like market makers:
they place their bids and asks according to the their valuation or cost (their private
information) and the market history is made public. However, this design cannot be
easily extended to other markets, where, for instance, transactions occur on a one to
one basis. In ﬁnancial markets, people are also often trading though intermediaries.
Clients evaluate their portfolio manager according to the proﬁt she is able to make
and, therefore, the closing price becomes the relevant information to place orders
and to determine futures contract settlement prices (Cushing and Madhavan, 2000;
Hillion and Suominen, 2004; Comerton-Forde and Rydge, 2006). Furthermore, for
some traded commodities, such as steel, virtually all trades are conducted through
the so-called middlemen at individually negotiated prices. In the steel market, there
are no market makers or exchanges in which valid current bid and ask prices are
publicly posted (Rust and Hall, 2003).
The main aim of our paper is therefore to understand the behavior of the market
when agents are unaware of the history of asks and bids. In particular, we ask whether
the eﬃciency of DA is aﬀected by this information shrinkage. In particular, we use
our results to show that, under DA, the reduction of the information set has the only
eﬀect to reduce trades in equilibrium. Convergence to the equilibrium price is strongly
achieved. This seems to support the view expressed in Gode and Sunder (1993), i.e.
that the market rules of the DA mechanism are suﬃcient to attain convergence to the
equilibrium. To analyse our experimental results and discuss the role of information
in DA, we proceed by reviewing the main features of DA (market eﬃciency, sources of
market ineﬃciencies and transaction order) and comparing our experimental results
to the regularities of the ZI model, as reported by Cason and Friedman (1996).
3The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy review the literature of
market experiments. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 outlines
the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Equilibrium in competitive markets is a topic that has been extensively addressed in
the economic literature. Market experiments have indeed a long history that goes
back to Chamberlin (1948).
Smith (1962) has been the ﬁrst one to introduce negotiations in a form of oral
DA. He was able to prove that experimental markets operating under DA rules
yield prices and trading volumes consistent with competitive equilibrium predictions,
despite limited knowledge on the reservation values of other participants.
The main point of Smith’s experiment is to conceive a very simple framework
that, under some mild constraints, can deliver eﬃciently a competitive equilibrium
outcome. The challenge after Smith was to understand how was it possible to achieve
such a result. Economic literature moved thus in two main directions. On the
one hand, agent-based computational economists develop algorithms of computer-
ized trading, in order to understand how automata behave in such a setting and to
disentangle the eﬀect of market rules (what we ﬁguratively refers as the Invisible
Hand) and learning. On the other hand, theoretical economists have tried to give
foundation to the price formation mechanism in DA.
The paper of Gode and Sunder (1993) pioneered the research stream of the agent-
based computational economics. Their work aims at disentangling the forces leading
to the equilibrium in competitive market experiments, i.e. understanding the role
of market discipline (i.e. the rules of the market) and individual rationality in the
convergence to the equilibrium. They apply Smiths framework to what they call Zero
Intelligence Constrained (ZI − C) Agents. They endow their automata with a very
simple budget constraint: every buyer (seller) cannot buy (sell) at a price which is
higher (lower) than her reservation value, i.e. no player can trade at loss.
4Finally they compare these results to those obtained by human agents. For each of
these experiments, they report an allocative eﬃciency measure which is given by the
ratio between the actual surplus obtained by players and the maximum surplus that
can be extracted from the market. This eﬃciency measure is very useful in explaining
the performance of the market, as it gives a summary of all essential statistics (mean
and standard deviation of closing prices, traded quantity).
They ﬁnd that the average eﬃciency measure with ZI−C agents was 98.7% , which
is slightly higher than the average of 97.6% obtained by their human subjects. They
conclude that the eﬀect of human motivation and cognitive abilities has a second-order
magnitude at best Gode and Sunder (1993, p. 133).
Thus, Adam Smiths Invisible Hand is not as far from reality as it seems to be.
That is, the DA setting by itself is pushing the market toward the equilibrium. The
aim of ACE researchers has been so far to develop new automata trading algorithms,
that are able to reproduce more eﬃciently human behavior in a competitive market
(for an extensive review on this point see, e.g. Duﬀy, 2006) 1.
Experimental economists and game theorists reproduced the experiments in dif-
ferent fashions; they worked on obtaining a theoretical model able to explain the price
formation mechanisms in a double auction market; and they extensively used market
experiments in order to explain students how competitive equilibria may arise in a
simpliﬁed framework (Holt, 1996; Ruﬄe, 2003).
Wilson (1987), Friedman (1991), Easley and Ledyard (1993) and Gjerstad and
Dickhaut (1998), among others, develop theoretical models of price formation in a DA
setting. In particular, Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998) model can account for important
regularities of price formation in DA. Namely, prices and allocations in the model
converge to the competitive equilibrium with nearly fully eﬃcient allocations. These
models are important because they give testable implications on the outcomes of DA.
A paper that pins down the three stream of literature (experimental, ACE and
1There has been a widespread debate on the real contribution of ACE researcher to the under-
standing of double auction mechanism. We do not enter this debate in more details. Interested
reader may refer to Gjerstad and Shachat (2007) and Tubaro (2009)
5theoretical) is the one by Cason and Friedman (1996). They test empirically the
predictions of the models by Wilson (1987), Friedman (1991) and the ZI model of
Gode and Sunder (1993). They ﬁnd that these models are quite poor predictors of
agents’ behavior in the lab. However, they argue that the ZI model is the one which
delivers the closest predictions to their empirical data. Therefore, they advice using
the ZI model as null hypothesis for any other model.
3 The Experimental design
This paper introduces a design that follows Smith (1962) in that valuations and costs
are exogenously given and Cason and Friedman (1996) in that players are allowed to
trade only one unit per period. We distinguish between a control treatment equivalent
to the standard market experiment with ﬁnancial-market-like centralized information;
and what we call an uninformed treatment, where we do not provide our players any
information about asks and bids.
We run computerized experiments using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions were
held at Bocconi University in Milan during a ﬁrst year introductory course in microe-
conomics in March 2007, March 2008 and October 2009. We involve in this classroom
experiment about a half of enrolled students, i.e. about 800 students and 20 sessions
per year.
We deﬁne the experiment (or equivalently, the game)t ob em a d eo fthree sessions.
Each session is made of three periods of equal clock time length. We change the period
length within a given experiment, so that each trading period lasts 120 seconds in
the ﬁrst and second sessions and 60 seconds only in the third session. Reducing the
clock time length allows us to assess how much market rule matters in our framework,
i.e. if there is any Invisible Hand embodied in the market structure. From now on,
we deﬁne the trading time, or just time, of a transaction its ordinal position in the
sequence of trades. Thus, for instance, a pt with t = 10 is the price at which the good
has been sold/bought in the 10th trade observed in the market.
At the beginning of each session, participants are given three pieces of informa-
6tion: their id, their role (either buyer or seller) and their redemption value. They
never know about the distributions of costs and valuations. While the role and the
redemption value are kept until the end of the session, the id changes at every trading
period, so that trading counterparts cannot identify themselves using the information
related to their ids. Every seller owns only one unit of the good and her valuation sets
the minimum amount she can cash for that unit. Buyer’s valuation sets instead the
maximum amount she can spend for one unit of the good. The player’s valuation is
private information and it always appears on her screen. At the end of each session,
roles and valuations are reshuﬄed, so that a given player might change her role, her
redemption value or both.
We keep the number of traders constant over diﬀerent experiments (between 34
and 42 subjects took part to each game). We discarded all experiments for which the
two sides of the market are asymmetric. We also had to discard some experiments
due to z − Tree crashes over the game. We end up having 17 experiments for the
control treatment and a total number of subjects equal to 682; and 20 experiments for
the uninformed treatment and 739 subjects. The uninformed treatment experiments
were run in 2007 and 2008. The control treatment experiments were run in 2009
In the control treatment, asks and bids are centralized information, so that every
buyer (seller) is always informed about the best ask (bid) on the market. We then do
not need to provide ids to player, as long as any counterpart can possibly respond to
an oﬀer. Once a proposal is accepted, the closing price appears on every screen.
In the uninformed treatment, a player can send an oﬀer to a single counterpart,
by indicating the amount of the oﬀer and the counterpart’s id. Only one oﬀer can be
submitted at a time. If the oﬀer is accepted, then the ids of the buyer and the seller
and the closing price appear on every player’s screen. If the counterpart does not
reply, the oﬀer may be withdrawn and a new oﬀer can be made that diﬀers either in
terms of the amount, the counterpart’s id or both. However, asks and bids submitted
to a speciﬁc player are not disclosed. As a consequence, every player has a limited
idea of the evaluations on the market. If a player receives more than one oﬀer at a
time, those oﬀers are automatically ranked, so that the best deal always appears on
7the top.
A couple of remarks are in order. In the uninformed treatment, the bid/ask im-
provement rule cannot hold in general. Moving to a counterpart which has a diﬀerent
information and a diﬀerent redemption value is always possible. Furthermore, the
informational spillovers are limited in our treatment. Of course, summing up all the
information sets of all players in the mar k e tw o u l dg i v ee x a c t l yt h es a m eo u t c o m e
as in the control treatment. This reﬂect the impossibility of our players to directly
observe the bid-ask spread on the market. This can be easily interpreted a search
market with no intermediation: every player is in a quest for the best counterpart to
close a transaction for a given quantity of the good.
At the end of each period and for both treatments, players see on the screen their
payoﬀ that is equal to the diﬀerence between their valuation and the closing price, if
they are buyers, or to the diﬀerence between the closing price and their cost, if they
are sellers. Players are not remunerated for their participation to the experiment.
In order to give the right incentive to play fairly, at the end of each experiment,
players are told that they will be ranked according to their “corrected ”proﬁts: since
redemption values are assigned randomly, we do not want to penalize those that are
less lucky. Therefore, we create a correction factor that increases as the distance
between the redemption value of the player and the equilibrium price decreases. We
then ask to the two players having earned the highest and lowest proﬁt to stand up.
The former is praised publicly for his performance. The latter instead can be ﬂouted
by groupmates.
In order to sharply test for consistent behavior over time, we apply instantaneous
shock to either demand or supply both for the control and uniformed treatment. We
deﬁne a shock as the movement of one of the two curves that leads to a change in the
equilibrium price and quantity. Since in this framework we focus on price changes and
not on absolute price, we consider shocks to demand or supply to be symmetric and
equivalent, as long as they turn out to bring the same equilibrium quantity. Consider
the example reported in ﬁgure 1. The point A determines the initial equilibrium
conditions with a price of 7.5 and a quantity of 10. Now suppose we exogenously
8Figure 1: Eﬀects of a shock on the competitive market equilibrium
increase demand. This will lead us to the point B, where the price is higher and
equal to 8.5 and quantity is equal to 12. If we had instead to increase the supply of
the same amount, this would have led us to the point C, where we would have had
the same equilibrium quantity (12) at a lower price (6.5).
We thus report shocks in terms of the eﬀect they have on the equilibrium quantity,
i.e. we deﬁne an upward (downward) shock, as a movement of the two curves towards
a higher (lower) equilibrium quantity. These shocks normally occur during the second
session in period 1. However, they are not always applied. So for session 2 period 1,
we analyse separately results for experiments with and without shock. Subjects are
not given any information about shocks.
We report results according to some crucial observables in market experiments
and, following Cason and Friedman (1996), we compare them with the ZI behavioral
9model2.
1. Market Eﬃciency: is deﬁned as in Gode and Sunder (1993) as the surplus
realized from trade over the potential surplus. In the ZI model, market ef-
ﬁciency is designed to be very high. Buyers and sellers, who are still on the
market, place asks and bids in random sequences. In particular, the simula-
tions run by Cason and Friedman (1996) are designed to stop when no more
trades are possible. The search market would be of course less eﬃcient than the
full information market. A more in-depth eﬃciency audit on traded prices and
quantities can shed light on the source of this eﬃciency gap.
2. Sources of Ineﬃciency: there are two main reasons why eﬃciency may
fall below 100 percent. One is given by extra-marginal units transact (EM-
ineﬃciency); and because of infra-marginal units not exchanged (V-ineﬃciency).
We deﬁne extra-marginal players to be those buyers (sellers) who have a val-
uation lower (cost higher) than the equilibrium price. Intra-marginal players
are deﬁned accordingly to be those buyers (sellers) who have a valuation (cost)
higher (lower) than or equal to the equilibrium price. By the deﬁnition of
the equilibrium in the ZI model, V-ineﬃciency cannot arise. Therefore, extra
marginal players transact should be the only source of ineﬃciency. In a search
model, infra marginal players may also have a probability to ﬁnd a trading part-
ner. We then expect V-ineﬃciency to arise and to be higher, in general than in
the control treatment.
3. Transaction order:t h eZI model predicts that buyers with high valuation
(seller with low costs) are more likely to exit the market before. This prediction
is essential for convergence to the equilibrium price. If infra-marginal play-
ers with redemption value further away from the equilibrium are more likely
to exit the market earlier, those who drives the market price are players with
2We did not use here Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998) model, simply because its underlying as-
sumptions do not ﬁt our experimental treatment.
10redemption values very close to the equilibrium price. Therefore, a complemen-
tary analysis computes the observed rank correlation between trading times and
buyers’ valuations and between trading times and sellers’ costs to test this the-
oretical transaction order with the one produced in the experiment. In a search
market, buyers with higher valuation and seller with lower costs have a much
higher probability to ﬁnd a suitable counterpart. We then expect the search
market to be closer to the ZI prediction.
4R e s u l t s
We report the results of our experiments following the outline we gave in the latter
section. We start by auditing the eﬃciency of our experiments and we analyse more
closely the price convergence and autocorrelation.
4.1 Market Eﬃciency
Table 1 reports the mean eﬃciency value for the two treatments for each session of
the game by period. We observe a very high eﬃciency both for the control and the
uninformed treatment.
The results for the control treatment are in line with previous outcomes of Gode
and Sunder (1993), who obtain an average eﬃciency of 97.6%, and of Cason and
Friedman (1996) who report an average level of eﬃciency between 88.4% and 93.9%
3, depending on the experience of subjects. As expected, we ﬁnd that eﬃciency
is generally lower for the uninformed treatment by roughly 10%. Eﬃciency sharply
increase in the uninformed treatment, in presence of a shock, while the eﬀect of a shock
is completely reversed in the control treatment, i.e. eﬃciency slightly decreases.
There is no unambiguous way to understand if the eﬃciency loss is signiﬁcative
of not. The ﬁrst step is to capture the source of this eﬃciency gap. A better under-
standing of this gap may also help determine the signiﬁcative eﬀect of a shock for the
uniformed treatment. The eﬃciency index is a summary measure of diﬀerent features
3Cason and Friedman (1996, p. 1321)
11Table 1: Eﬃciency audit by treatment, session and period
Control Uninformed
No Shock Shock No Shock Shock
Session 1 Period 1 90.53% 80.03%
Period 2 95.14% 86.85%
Period 3 96.00% 91.18%
Session 2 Period 1 97.61% 94.35% 86.19% 96.93%
Period 2 98.65% 92.44%
Period 3 96.00% 88.72%
Session 3 Period 1 95.08% 93.51%
Period 2 95.60% 86.00%
Period 3 94.42% 83.83%
of the market statistics (price mean, standard deviation and traded quantity). We
therefore need to disentangle these eﬀects in the two treatments.
We start by analysing price convergence to its equilibrium value. We analyse
here two deﬁnitions of convergence. The former is the most common deﬁnition, as
reported in Smith (1962). We denote by pt, the closing price at time t,a n db yΔ pt the
diﬀerence between the price at time t and the price at time t−1. Our null hypothesis
is pt being a martingale series, such that
￿[pt|pt−1]=pt−1. Therefore:
pt = pt−1 + εt (1)
where εt is such that
￿[εt]=0a n d
￿[εtεs]=0 ∀t,s. From equation 1 we can there-
fore write ε = pt−pt−1, so that our assumption about residuals entails convergence of
the price changes towards zero. Moreover, the assumption of prices being a martin-
gale implies that agents on the market have rational expectations. Nevertheless, this
deﬁnition is quite unsatisfactory. Proving that the price changes are stationary is not
equivalent to prove that the mean deviation from the equilibrium value is close to 0
(Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998) 4. Therefore, we also check that the price deviation
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Figure 2: Price convergence (control treatment) (a) without and (b) with shock
from the equilibrium value is not too diﬀerent from 0.
To test for price convergence, according to the ﬁrst deﬁnition, we use an Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test. Detailed results are reported in the appendix. In general,
we can reject the null hypothesis of price changes being unit root. This is true both
for the control and the uniformed treatment and whenever a shock is implemented.
Figures 2 and 3 report the path of trading prices over time for the control and unin-
formed treatment, respectively. On the left panel of both ﬁgures we draw the price
path when there is no shock (session 1, period 2); on the right panel, when a shock is
in place (session 2, period 1). The trajectory of prices is mean-reverting, consistently
with previous ﬁnding, and it converges to the equilibrium price.
We now turn to the second deﬁnition of convergence5. We ﬁrst analyse the pe-
riods in which there is no shock. The mean of price deviation from the equilibrium
price is equal to −0.510 for the control treatment and to −2.243 for the uninformed
treatment. Both one tailed and two-tailed t-tests reject the null hypothesis of these
means being equal to 06. The absolute mean of price deviations is substantially higher
if, after several periods, the mean deviation of all trades from equilibrium is small ”.
5For a more detailed decomposition of mean and standard deviation of price deviation from
the equilibrium see table (7) in the appendix. Figures (4) and (5) in the appendix also report
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Figure 3: Price convergence (uninformed treatment) (a) without and (b) with shock
in the uninformed treatment and, although it seems that the absolute deviation is
decreasing over the game, it may be still one of the sources of ineﬃciency in the
search market. In particular, if the mean trading price is costantly lower than the
equilibrium price, it may allow more extra marginal players to trade. The mean value
of the standard deviation of prices is equal to 6.25 in the control treatment and to
6.68 in the uninformed treatment. There is therefore no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
standard deviation of closing prices in the two treatments.
In periods where a shock is in place, the situation is not substantially diﬀerent.
The mean deviation is equal to −0.404 for the control treatment and to −2.761 for
the uninformed. Standard deviation in this case is higher in the control treatment
(8.45) with respect to the uninformed (7.30). In the control treatment, trading prices
are therefore closer to the equilibrium one but more erratic around the mean. The
reverse is true for the uninformed treatment. However, this is not enough to explain
the increase in eﬃciency in the uninformed treatment. The mean deviation value is
consistent with the results we have seen for the sessions without shock. The fact that
standard deviation in lower for the uninformed treatment is not signiﬁcative either:
in session 1 period 2, we observe the same phenomenon, but this does not correspond
to a higher eﬃciency in the uninformed treatment.
We turn now to the market quantity and we compare it with the equilibrium one.
When there is no shock, in the control treatment, we ﬁnd that the market quantity is
14lower than the equilibrium one about 15% of the time; in the uninformed treatment,
instead, the market quantity is lower roughtly 80% of the time. When we apply
a shock, in the control, the traded quantity is never smaller than the equilibrium
one; on the contrary, in the uninformed treatment, it is smaller roughtly 24% of the
time7. If the market quantity is lower than the equilibrium quantity, this implies that
there are infra marginal units that are not traded. Furthermore, other infra-marginal
players may be bumped by extra-marginal ones. This phenomenon is clearly more
evident in the uninformed treatment. If we look more carefully at the decomposition
of market versus equilibrium quantity (see table 8 in the appendix), we notice an
inverse relationship between eﬃciency and the percentage of times the traded quantity
is smaller than the equilibrium one. We conclude that this is the main source of the
eﬃciency gap between the control and the uninformed treatment. Moreover, this also
seems to capture the sharp increase in eﬃciency when there is a shock.
We can explain this as follows. Suppose that there is an upward shift of the de-
mand curve, which increases the valuations of all buyers and therefore the equilibrium
quantity (a downward shift of the supply curve is exactly equivalent, as explained in
section 3). This implies, ceteris paribus, that every buyer has a higher probability of
accepting an ask from a seller. If sellers have rational expectations, they accept and
post prices which are equal in mean to the preceding price. This would eventually
increase the market quantity more than the equilibrium one. Now, suppose instead
that there is a downward shift in the demand curve (an upward shift in the supply
curve being equivalent), so that buyers, ceteris paribus, have lower valuations, i.e. a
lower probability of sending a bid which would be accepted or of accepting an ask.
Together with rational expectation, this entails that traded quantity is lower than
equilibrium. If we disentangle the eﬀects of upward and downward shocks, as in Ta-
ble (2), we can see that our intuition is correct. The increase in eﬃciency is therefore
due to the fact that our sample is more populated by upward shocks.
In summary, we ﬁnd that in the uninformed treatment prices converges over time.
Nevertheless, this market price is constantly lower than the equilibrium price and so
7For a detailed decomposition by treatment, session and period, see Table (8) in the appendix.
15Table 2: Upward vs downward shocks
Av. Eﬃciency Traded/Equilibrium Frequency
< = >
Upward shock 99.12% 8% 49% 43% 82%
Downward shock 86.63% 100% 0% 0% 18%
is the traded quantity with respect to the equilibrium quantity. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that the search market is much more sensitive to a shock: an upward (downward)
shock positively (negatively) aﬀects the traded quantity and, thus, the eﬃciency of
the market itself.
4.2 Sources of Ineﬃciency
There is no unambiguous method to disentangle EM and V ineﬃciency. We then
perform an ineﬃciency audit as in Rust et al. (1993). To brieﬂy explain the ratio of
auditing ineﬃciency, consider the following example. Suppose that 2 extra-marginal
buyers manage to trade and that 3 infra-marginal buyers are left out of the market.
Now, we need to determine which of the 3 infra-marginal buyers have been bumped
by the 2 extra-marginal units. We simply proceed by considering that every buyer is
equally likely to have been bumped.
Table (3) reports decomposition of ineﬃciency for extra-marginal trades that are
executed (EM-ineﬃciency) and for intra-marginal trades that are not executed (V-
ineﬃciency) for each period of the game. EM-ineﬃciency is prevalent in the con-
trol treatment and roughly constant within periods. This is consistent with the ZI
prediction. In the uninformed treatment, V-ineﬃciency is constantly higher than
EM-ineﬃciency. This reinforces the point in the previous section, where we show
that the eﬃciency gap between control and uninformed treatment is caused by the
market quantity being smaller than the equilibrium one in the uniformed treatment.
The ineﬃciency audit tells us, indeed, that ineﬃciency in the uninformed treatment
is explained mostly by proﬁtable trade that are not executed.
16Table 3: Sources of ineﬃciency by treatment, session and period
Control Uninformed
EM-ineﬃciency No Shock Shock No Shock Shock
Session 1 Period 1 83.46% 40.30%
Period 2 98.77% 53.91%
Period 3 100% 65.26%
Session 2 Period 1 100% 100% 30.55% 82.99%
Period 2 100% 52.82%
Period 3 94.96% 35.19%
Session 3 Period 1 87.92% 44.07%
Period 2 90.00% 26.94%
Period 3 74.96% 29.39%
V-ineﬃciency No Shock Shock No Shock Shock
Session 1 Period 1 16.54% 59.70%
Period 2 1.23% 46.09%
Period 3 0% 34.74%
Session 2 Period 1 0% 0% 69.45% 17.01%
Period 2 0% 47.18%
Period 3 5.04% 64.81%
Session 3 Period 1 12.08% 55.93%
Period 2 10.00% 73.06%
Period 3 25.04% 70.61%
17Again, when a shock is implemented, EM-ineﬃciency raises sharply and it doubles
with respect to the same period without a shock. Again, there is a diﬀerence between
upward and downward shock. As expected, EM-ineﬃciency in the upward shock case
is very high and roughly equal to 94%. The search market become, therefore, very
close to the control DA market. When there is a downward shock, EM-ineﬃciency
is about 43%, which makes it consistent with the values in other periods.
In summary, the uninformed treatment is very far from the ZI hypothesis of EM
being the only source of ineﬃciency. The eﬃciency gap in the search market is mostly
explained by infra-marginal traders left out of the market. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the results reported in the previous section: quantity is the main source of
ineﬃciency in the search market.
4.3 Transaction order
The ZI model is founded on the hypothesis that tradings between high-value buyers
and low-cost sellers are more likely to occur earlier in the game. In order to test for
this hypothesis, we compute rank correlation coeﬃcients both between the transaction
order and the buyer valuations and between the transaction order and the seller
costs. If the hypothesis in the ZI model holds true, we expect to ﬁnd a positive rank
correlation in the former case and a negative rank correlation in the latter.
Tables 4 and 5 report the 5% and 95% percentile value for the Spearman’s rho
and Kendall’s tau rank correlation coeﬃcients. The assumption in the ZI model
seems to be plausible: buyers with higher valuation and sellers with lower cost are
able to trade earlier in the game. This seems to be true especially for sellers (as
the 5% − 95% interval is mostly included in the positive line), while buyers show a
wider variation in rank correlation estimates8. However, some of the estimates are not
signiﬁcant, which indicates independence between the transaction order and trader
8This may be a consequence of sellers being more active traders. A simple frequency statistics
show that, in both treatments, transactions which are closed after a seller proposal are about 60%
of total trades. If sellers are more active, they would also ﬁnd more easily an available counterpart.
Since their probability of exiting the market decreases with their cost, this gives the expected result.
18Table 4: Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho estimate between transaction order and
trader value (Control Treatment)
Buyer value Seller cost
No Shock
5% centile 95% centile 5% centile 95% centile
Kendall tau −0.3641 0.2590 −0.1251 0.5520
Spearman rho −0.5100 0.3879 −0.1909 0.7098
Shock
5% centile 95% centile 5% centile 95% centile
Kendall tau −0.3072 0.5165 −0.2967 0.4333
Spearman rho −0.4015 0.6714 −0.4374 0.6058
values9. We also notice that the ranking coeﬃcients for the uninformed treatment
lay on the expected interval. This may be explained by the fact that high valuation
buyers (low cost sellers) have a higher probability of exiting the market, no matter
the counterpart they are matched with.
Therefore, the search market with DA mimics the results of our control treatment:
buyers and sellers with higher valuations and lower costs, respectively, are trading
earlier and the infra-marginal players closer to the equilibrium price are those who
drives the market to the equilibrium itself.
We conclude that, in the search market, buyers with higher valuations and sellers
with lower costs are, generally, able to trade earlier. This is consistent with the fact
that these players have also higher probability of a successful matching and it is also
consistent with the ZI prediction.
9p-values not reported.
19Table 5: Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho estimate between transaction order and
trader value (Uninformed Treatment)
Buyer value Seller cost
No Shock
5% centile 95% centile 5% centile 95% centile
Kendall tau −0.4612 0.1994 −0.0988 0.5376
Spearman rho −0.6220 0.3115 −0.1367 0.7399
Shock
5% centile 95% centile 5% centile 95% centile
Kendall tau −0.4333 0.1538 −0.0714 0.6888
Spearman rho −0.5852 0.2308 −0.0238 0.8197
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyse the equilibrium and the eﬃciency of a laboratory search
market. We simply extend the DAmechanisms to a market in which buyers and sellers
are unaware of the history of asks and bids. This framework is used to understand
the behavior of traders in commodity markets (like steel) and in stock markets where
players are transacting through brokers or traders, so that they post their oﬀers simply
on the basis of closing prices.
This paper is complementary to more recent and older literature on market exper-
iments. While competitive market equilibrium is often the benchmark for economists,
we believe that markets in general and ﬁnancial markets in particular are far from
being competitive. That is the reason why we introduce informational frictions in
the market and we try to understand how these frictions aﬀect convergence to the
equilibrium and eﬃciency.
We ﬁnd evidence that the eﬃciency is drastically reduced in the search market
because of lower quantity exchanged. We also ﬁnd that, while prices converge to a
long term value, this value is often signiﬁcatively smaller than the equilibrium price.
In particular, a search market with no intermediation can exclude infra-marginal
20players from trading, which is indeed the main source of ineﬃciency.
Eﬃciency is the search market is also much more sensitive to shocks, in particular
to upward shocks. We show that, when players are rational in posting their asks and
bids, a positive shock dramatically increase the quantity exchanged on the market.
The eﬀect of a downward shock is instead less dramatic, as long as it implies the
same distorsions on the market, i.e. an exchanged number of units lower than the
equilibrium one.
Further research on the topic may focus on introducing a third agent in the lab:
the broker. This is to see how pure intermediation between buyers and sellers can
aﬀect the market eﬃciency. In particular, this setting can be used as a benchmark for
testing in the lab the so-called closing price manipulation in ﬁnancial market (Hillion
and Suominen, 2004), i.e. if brokers are really trying to manipulate prices in order to
attempt to alter their customers inference of their execution ability.
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236 Appendix
6.1 Classroom experiment’s Instructions
General setting Today, you participate to a laboratory experiment simulating a
market for a generic good. This is a computerized experiment. Some of you are
randomly assigned the role of buyers and some the role of sellers. You will know
your role at the beginning of the experiment and you will keep it until the end. All
buyers/sellers will be also assigned a valuation for this speciﬁc good.
Every seller owns only one unit of the good and her valuation sets the minimum
amount she is willing to receive for that unit. Buyer’s valuation sets instead the
maximum amount she is willing to spend for one unit of the good.
Your valuation will be private information and it will appear on the left top of your
screen at every period. There will be 3 trading periods of 2 minutes each. Your
valuation will stay the same for all periods.
Game setting: Trading rules There are x students participating to this experi-
ment. Before the experiment starts, the program will assign randomly to x/2 students
t h er o l eo fbuyers and to x/2 students the role of sellers.
At the beginning of each trading period, three pieces of information will appear on
the left top of your computer screen: your role (either buyer or seller), an id number
(from 1 to x/2) and your valuation of the good. For example, either this screen could
appear:
In this period you are buyer n. 3
The maximum amount you can spend for a unit of the good is 80
or the following one:
In this period you are seller n. 15
The minimum amount you can accept for a unit of the good is 30
We recall that your role and valuation will stay the same for all trading periods,
while your id may change, so that your trading counterpart in period t could not
24identify you in period t +1 .
The ﬁrst trading period will start when every player ﬁnishes to read the instructions.
Your computer screen will be in turn split into ﬁve smaller screens (cf. Figure 1 and
2). Some of them require you to plug information; some others provide you updated
information on the game. We will refer to the former as active screens and to the
latter as passive screens.
• The left top passive screen includes the information about your role, valuation
and id.
• The right top active screen includes two blank boxes. The one on the top re-
quires you to enter the id of the counterpart you wish to submit an oﬀer to.
The one on the bottom requires you to enter a trade proposal to the previously
selected counterpart. This proposal is nothing but the price at which you wish
to close the deal. Once you ﬁll the two boxes, you can send your proposal to
the selected counterpart by clicking on the Enter button.
Important remarks:
1. The id number must be lower than the total number of possible trading
partners on the market (i.e. lower than x/2).
2. A buyer cannot bid above her valuation, that is, a buyer is allowed to
propose any price lower or equal than her valuation of the good. Similarly,
a seller cannot ask below her cost, that is, a seller is allowed to propose
any price that is greater or equal than her valuation of the good.
3. The trading proposal may be withdrawn at any time by clicking on the
corresponding button Withdraw.
4. Every player can send only one proposal at a time. Once a proposal has
been sent, if you want to replace or modify it, you have to withdraw it and
send a new one. The new proposal may diﬀer either in terms of the id of
the counterpart (ﬁrst box), the amount (second box) or both.
25• The right bottom passive screen informs you about the oﬀers that you are
receiving together with the id of the counterpart which is sending the oﬀer.
The program will automatically rank the oﬀers. That is, a buyer will visualize
the asks from the lowest to the highest; a seller will visualize bids from the
highest to the lowest. Each time a new oﬀer appears, you can close the deal by
clicking on the button Buy, if you are a buyer, or Sell, if you are a seller. When
you receive several proposals, you have to select just one, eventually the best
one. Given the way the program is ranking oﬀers, the best one will always be
the one on the top, both for a buyer and a seller. Every time a player decides to
withdraw her proposal, it disappears from the screen of the counterpart whom
that oﬀer has been sent.
• The left bottom passive screen informs you about the state of the market. Each
time a deal is closed, it reports the id of the seller (ﬁrst column), the trading
price (second column) and the id of the buyer (third column). Trading prices
will thus appear in chronological order. Once a player closes a deal (because
either her oﬀer has been accepted or she accepts an oﬀer she receives), she
cannot send or receive any oﬀer until the end of the period.
• The middle passive screen informs you about the trading partners who are still
on the market, so that you know whom you can still send oﬀers to. It reports
the ids in increasing order. The program will prevent you to send any oﬀer to
counterpart who are already out of the market.
Information at the end of every trading period At the end of the ﬁrst trading
period, your pay-oﬀ will appear on your screen. Your pay-oﬀ will be equal to:
• the diﬀerence between the closing price and your valuation of the good, if you
are a seller;
• the diﬀerence between your valuation of the good and the closing price, if you
are a buyer.
26At the end of every other period, your pay-oﬀ for that period will appear together
with your total pay-oﬀ, that is the sum of all pay-oﬀs obtained so far.
Players’ Goal The goal of every seller is to maximize, at every trading period, the
diﬀerence between the closing price and her valuation of the good. She has thus to
try to sell the good at the highest possible price.
The goal of every buyer is to maximize, at every trading period, the diﬀerence between
her valuation of the good and the closing price. She has thus to try to buy the good
at the lowest possible price.
At the end of the experiment, students’ pay-oﬀs will be ranked in decreasing order.
This ranking will appear on your screen. We will then ask to the two best students
(those with the highest pay-oﬀ) and to the two worst students (those with the lowest
pay-oﬀ) to stand-up. The former will be clapped and the latter will be ﬂouted.
276.2 Auxiliary Tables and Figures
Table 6: Summary statistics ADF test for price changes
Control Treatment
No Shock Shock
5% centile 50% centile 95% centile 5% centile 50% centile 95% centile
Session 1 Period 1 −7.60 −4.26 −2.62
Period 2 −7.44 −4.38 −2.83
Period 3 −8.43 −4.77 −2.74
Session 2 Period 4 −5.96 −4.98 −3.14 −8.06 −4.30 −2.43
Period 5 −7.78 −4.19 −2.42
Period 6 −5.90 −3.86 −2.59
Session 3 Period 7 −7.59 −4.00 −2.30
Period 8 −5.38 −4.01 −2.31
Period 9 −9.45 −3.69 −2.42
Uninformed Treatment
No Shock Shock
5% centile 50% centile 95% centile 5% centile 50% centile 95% centile
Session 1 Period 1 −19.41 −3.58 −2.01
Period 2 −7.80 −4.00 −2.10
Period 3 −6.92 −4.01 −1.14
Session 2 Period 4 −6.10 −4.24 −2.92 −10.08 −4.72 −2.41
Period 5 −5.19 −3.78 −2.22
Period 6 −6.03 −3.55 −2.03
Session 3 Period 7 −6.43 −3.80 −2.42
Period 8 −6.30 −4.25 −2.15
Period 9 −6.21 −3.78 −1.82
- ADF statistics critical values:
-1 %C r i t i c a lV a l u e :−3.750;
-5 %C r i t i c a lV a l u e :−3.000;

























kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 3.0000
Gaussian Kernel





























kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 4.5000
Gaussian Kernel
Distribution of price changes (control, shock)
(b) Shock
Figure 4: Nonparametric kernel estimator for the distribution of the diﬀerence be-
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Distribution of price changes (treatment, shock)
(b) Shock
Figure 5: Nonparametric kernel estimator for the distribution of the diﬀerence be-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 8: Traded (Tq) vs Equilibrium (Eq) quantity by treatment, session and period
No shock Control Treatment
Tq<Eq Tq= Eq Tq > Eq
Session 1 Period 1 26% 56% 18%
Period 2 5% 34% 61%
Period 3 0% 40% 60%
Session 2 Period 1 0% 31% 69%
Period 2 0% 46% 54%
Period 3 11% 38% 51%
Session 3 Period 1 27% 35% 38%
Period 2 15% 30% 55%
Period 3 40% 17% 43%
Uninformed Treatment
Tq<Eq Tq= Eq Tq > Eq
Session 1 Period 1 82% 18% 0%
Period 2 83% 11% 5%
Period 3 66% 17% 17%
Session 2 Period 1 100% 0% 0%
Period 2 62% 20% 18%
Period 3 77% 16% 7%
Session 3 Period 1 83% 11% 6%
Period 2 93% 7% 0%
Period 3 100% 0% 0%
Shock Control Treatment
Tq<Eq Tq= Eq Tq > Eq
Session 2 Period 4 0% 23% 77%
Uninformed Treatment
Tq<Eq Tq= Eq Tq > Eq
Session 2 Period 4 24% 40% 36%
31